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Abstract
This reply defends the need for a specifically materialist historiography of modes of production 
other than capitalism; argues that Marxists should see history as being driven by the state as 
much as it is by classes; defends the scientific value of the category ‘merchant capitalism’; and 
explains why Marx came around to seeing the slave plantations as part of ‘total capital’. It 
concludes by suggesting both that Marx allowed for different levels of determination when 
thinking about the origins of capitalism, and that Brenner’s account of the transition in English 
agriculture has now been seriously weakened by Jane Whittle’s critique of it.
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It may help to start by foregrounding what I see as some of the key arguments 
propounded in the essays under discussion in this Symposium. 1. A major 
argument that runs through much of the book is the idea that agriculture is 
typically characterised by a combination of forms of labour, a ‘much wider range 
of relationships of exploitation on the land’ than simplified uses of Marxist 
theory are liable to suggest.1 2. Since the source of value and surplus-value 
(as of material production more generally) is living labour and not the form 
that labour assumes in this or that society (the ‘determinate’ ‘form’ of labour), 
precapitalist forms of exploitation may well be integrated into capitalism (the 
production and accumulation of capital), where they function as capitalist 
relations of production (more precisely, as moments in the totalisation of such 
relations). Thus modern slavery can be seen as a purely capitalist institution, 
since ‘the business in which slaves [were] used [was] conducted by capitalists’. 
3. Against the classless model of an ‘Asiatic despotism’ that has dominated 
and confused Marxist debates about non-European history, I argue that we 
1. The expression in quotes is from Beinart and Delius 1986, p. 33. 
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need a theory of the tributary mode of production as characterised both 
by the paramountcy of the state (both practical and legal) and by a form of 
class struggle that pitted ruler against ruling class. Since the tributary mode 
envelops rather more than a millennium of written history (an unbroken 
swathe that starts c.225–c.325), debates about the tributary mode would really 
have to study each of its forms of evolution separately and then compare them, 
since the ‘historical surroundings’ were so different, as Marx said in a roughly 
analogous context in his reply to Mikhailovsky (1877).2 A comparative history 
of this sort would crucially have to look at the composition of the ruling class 
and tensions and conflicts within it, as well as the subtle or dramatic ways in 
which the balance of power kept changing between rulers and ruling class.3 
This struggle was endemic to the mode of production but took different forms 
and had different outcomes depending on the nature and strength of the 
parties involved. 4. To read Capital as if Marx were writing history runs the risk 
of radically impoverishing the history of capitalism. Not only is this a history 
that still has to be written in a coherent way but we also have to start by seeing 
it as a more complex totalisation than a simple ‘transition’ from the feudal 
mode of production to capitalism, let alone one that was rehearsed in a purely 
national setting. ‘The idea of capitalism in one country, taken literally, is only 
a bit more plausible than that of socialism’.4 Here the category ‘commercial 
capitalism’ is one of the important ways in which some perspective can be 
gained on centuries of history that otherwise remain nebulously suspended in 
what were, after all, largely agrarian modes of production, whether feudal or 
tributary. At least three of these issues recur in the discussion below.
To start with John Haldon’s long and stimulating paper; ‘In contrast to Banaji, 
therefore, I would suggest that what Marx is referring to when he writes of 
“the specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out 
of direct producers”, is simply the difference between direct (coercive) and 
indirect (through the labour-market) exploitation of labour power, and that 
to read institutional forms as an economic category in order to distinguish 
2. Marx cited in McLellan 1971, p. 136.
3. Pulleyblank 1955, Twitchett 1962, Cheynet 1990, Sifonas 1994, Crone 1980, Jackson 1999, 
Richards 1975, and Husain 1999 are good examples of this level of analysis. ‘Estate building’ moved 
in cycles, feeding off the growing numbers of landless in a pattern strikingly evident in Byzantine 
and Chinese history. The apparent immobility of peasant history reflects its cyclical structure, 
repeated bouts of dispossession, struggle and re-emergence. The state was never simply a passive 
instrument of the ‘powerful’ in these conflicts. 
4. Anderson 2005, p. 251, about Brenner; from the brilliant review of Merchants and 
Revolution. 
 J. Banaji / Historical Materialism 21.4 (2013) 129–143 131
between modes of production is misleading’ (italics mine).5 Now apart from 
the fact that the last thing the labour market is, in any capitalist society, is a 
purely ‘economic’ mechanism (one that has nothing to do with law, politics, 
social policy, etc. and the sorts of coercion they bring to bear), it is odd to 
deprive Marx’s use of the term ‘specific’ of the resonance it clearly has by 
suggesting that it refers ‘simply’ to the general (and putative) contrast between 
‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’. When Marx refers to precapitalist modes of 
production as ‘all previous modes of production based on the exploitation of 
the masses in one form or the other’6 or credits Richard Jones with a ‘sense of 
the historical differences in modes of production’,7 he cannot mean that these 
‘forms’ and ‘historical differences’ refer only to the contrast between capitalism 
and everything before it or have nothing to do with major differences in the 
way the subjection of labour is constructed and organised in long swathes 
of history before capitalism. ‘Epochs of production’, ‘historical stages of 
production’, ‘different forms of society’, ‘different economic epochs’, etc. were 
all Marx’s way of insisting that there was considerable diversity within and 
among precapitalist modes of production. Volume One of Capital even refers 
to ‘economic formations of society of the most diverse kinds’.8
The pervasive grip of formalism over Marxist theory in the seventies and 
eighties explains why a whole generation of Marxists would end up subscribing 
to a deep scepticism about doing much with ‘modes of production’ beyond 
paying the customary lip-service expected of a loyal congregation. I suspect 
that neither Anderson nor Haldon escaped this dilemma entirely. In The 
State and the Tributary Mode of Production, a seminal contribution, Haldon 
cites Anderson as saying ‘All modes of production in class societies prior to 
capitalism extract surplus labour from the immediate producers by means 
of extra-economic coercion’9 and concludes, ‘it is therefore [according 
to Anderson – JB] impossible to identify them on the basis of economic 
relationships as such’.10 This may be a fair statement of Anderson’s position in 
Lineages since he does say, ‘All other previous modes of exploitation operate 
through extra-economic sanctions’, yet Haldon’s own position is essentially not 
very different. According to him, for Marx ‘the crucial distinguishing element, 
which makes one mode of production different from another, lies precisely in 
“the mode in which . . . surplus labour is in each case extracted from the actual 
  5. Haldon 2013, p. 47.
  6. Marx 1981, p. 754.
  7. Marx 1968, p. 399; Marx’s emphasis.
  8. Marx 1976, p. 745.
  9. Anderson 1974, p. 403.
10. Haldon 1993, pp. 92ff.; my emphasis.
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producer, the labourer” ’.11 Since ‘the mode in which surplus labour is extracted 
from the actual producer’ is reducible to only two general categories, ‘rent’ and 
‘surplus-value’, and all class-based precapitalist modes of production are based 
fundamentally and uniformly on ‘rent’, it does not seem to make a great deal 
of difference in the end whether, like Anderson, one uses ‘the forms of their 
superstructures’ to demarcate the different modes, or, with Haldon, bases the 
differences between them or their actual histories on ‘institutional forms’. What 
evaporates in both conceptions (superstructures/institutions) is any sense that 
we can write a specifically materialist history of anything other than capitalism. 
But the armature of a materialist historiography lies not in abstractions like 
‘rent’ or ‘the mode in which surplus labour is extracted’ or ‘methods of surplus-
appropriation’ but in the fundamental categories of history (‘objects to be 
constructed’, as Vilar reminded us)12 – class, labour (including the labour of 
war), the state, money, etc., but also the ‘productive forces’ conceived as the 
inert totality of ‘worked matter’ – all of which define the ‘economic structure 
of society’ and count therefore as ‘relations of production’ that are neither 
simply reducible to particular forms of exploitation of labour nor conceived 
so loosely as to count as the totality of all ‘institutions’, economic and non-
economic. The truly great works of economic and social history in the past 
ninety years, starting with Georges Lefebvre’s Les paysans du Nord pendant la 
Révolution française (1924) – both the grands ouvrages and numerous excellent 
monographs – all exemplify what a materialist historiography is and should 
look like even if, with Labrousse, one still believes l’histoire est à faire [history 
has yet to be invented]. If Braudel called Labrousse’s La crise de l’économie 
française à la fin de l’Ancien Régime (1944) ‘the greatest work of history to have 
appeared in France in the course of the last twenty-five years’,13 Labrousse 
himself, more interestingly, described La crise as ‘a new affirmation of the 
“materialist” interpretation of history’, clearly seeing it as a contribution to the 
kind of history Marx would have liked to see written.14
Finally, in downplaying the major economic differences between feudal 
and tributary ‘systems’, Haldon also states, ‘the pre-eminence of state power 
is, I think, greatly exaggerated, even in those social formations touched on 
by Banaji’.15 This is an extraordinary statement, not least because Haldon’s 
own work seems to me to demonstrate the opposite. In fact, tributary modes 
of production encapsulate a wider principle of historical materialism (at 
11.  Haldon 1993, p. 93.
12. Vilar 1974, p. 196; Vilar 1973, p. 93.
13. Burke 1990, p. 55.
14. Borghetti 2005, p. 63, citing Saly 1989.
15. Haldon 2013, p. 58.
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least they should do), which is that history is driven and shaped by the state 
as much as it is by classes. This general principle, of the protagonism of the 
state in history, was one that impressed Trotsky no end. As we know, he begins 
The History of the Russian Revolution with a brilliant sketch of the peculiarities 
of Russia’s development that chiefly invokes the active role of the state in 
shaping the evolution of Russia’s ‘possessing classes’.16 This was of course as 
true of the later Roman empire or of Sung China or the Indo-Muslim states 
as it was of Tsarism. It is this image of the autocratic state as a ‘state power 
which . . . creates its own bureaucratic apparatus’, ‘dissociates itself ’ from the 
landowning class, and ‘acquires its own enormous power, i.e., a state power 
which, while protecting the interests of the exploiters against the exploited, 
becomes a relatively independent force’17 that Haldon’s historical argument (in 
The State and the Tributary Mode of Production) reinforces powerfully against 
the instrumentalism that sees the absolutist state as the ‘repressive machine of 
a feudal class’,18 a conception (Anderson’s) worth contrasting with Hilferding’s 
more correct idea that the emergence of the ‘absolute monarchy’ encapsulated 
a ‘struggle of the state power against the ruling class’, one that for Hilferding 
was merely ‘supported by’ the bourgeoisie.19 The implications for Marxist 
theory are huge. For one thing, ‘it is not possible to deduce the nature of the 
state or explain its emergence by reference to the unmediated consequences 
of developments within the base’, as David Parker argued in relation to 
French absolutism.20 And secondly, states are not the passive instruments of 
classes they are sometimes made out to be but embody a distinct dialectical 
intelligibility, radically heterogeneous with classes, viz., that of organised 
institutional groups that can act both as organs of ‘contraction and integration’ 
of the ruling class and as the sovereign unity of all classes, a ‘negation of the 
class struggle’ at the level of the nation or the empire, and play both these roles 
by virtue of their ‘autonomy’.21
It seems to me that many of the issues that Neeladri Bhattacharya raises are 
addressed, beyond my own general approach and arguments, to historical 
materialism and Marxist theory more generally. Bhattacharya asks if a Marxist 
16. Trotsky 1967, pp. 23–4.
17. Trotsky 1972, p. 338.
18. Anderson 1974, p. 195.
19. Hilferding 1981; based on Hilferding 1954 (not seen by me).
20. Parker 1990, p. 297. He also says, ‘there is a basis for suggesting that if one wished to find 
a motor of historical change in this period [the ancien régime] it is not to be found in the class 
struggle, in the development of the productive forces or in any aspect of the economy, but in the 
activities of the state’. 
21. Sartre 1976, pp. 635–42.
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history of modes of production must inevitably see workers as ‘docile bodies, 
victims of exploitation’;22 whether the calculations of employers are not 
shaped by ‘the choices of workers and peasants, the strategies they deploy’, 
etc.;23 why notions like ‘rationality’ must have a purely economic meaning;24 
and so on. I have no disagreement with any of this, least of all with his own 
sense as a historian that history deals with ‘form’ more than ‘essence’ and that 
no materialist historiography would be complete that did not integrate all 
determinations of human and social life including its cultural instruments and 
meanings. Apart from an early reading of Hegel, my own sense of method has 
always been maximally indebted to Sartre’s The Problem of Method and the 
two stupendous volumes it led into. The posthumous second volume of the 
Critique restates the methodological perspectives of that seminal essay in some 
interesting passages, in one of which Sartre states: ‘every incarnation is tied in 
two ways to the historical ensemble: on the one hand, in fact, it realizes in itself 
the latter’s condensation; on the other hand, it refers back in a decompressive 
blossoming to the ensemble of practical significations which determine it in its 
belonging to the social and historical field’.25 And again,
two dialectical procedures are possible on the basis of an identical social reality. On 
the one hand, a procedure of decompressive expansion which starts off from the 
object to arrive at everything . . . in this case, thought may be termed detotalizing 
and the event loses out to the signified ensembles. On the other hand, a procedure 
of totalizing compression which, by contrast, grasps the centripetal movement of 
all the significations attracted and condensed in the event or in the object.26
Thus we have here a more mature description of what Sartre in The Problem 
of Method called the ‘progressive-regressive method’, with Sartre saying that 
the best history is defined as a synthetic movement, as what he calls ‘totalising 
compression’.
It may be worth clarifying, therefore, that the essays in Theory as History 
(with one or two exceptions, and even those are simply papers) are not 
exercises in actual history-writing so much as attempts to lay the groundwork 
for a better, more rigorous kind of (social and economic) history. Their moment 
is that of ‘regression’ more than synthesis, of the ‘decompressive blossoming’ 
to a set of ‘signified ensembles’, ‘elementary and fundamental structures’, but 
explored historically to combat primitivist constructions of history that are less 
22. Bhattacharya 2013, p. 14.
23. Bhattacharya 2013, p. 15. 
24. Bhattacharya 2013, p. 22.
25. Sartre 1991, p. 188.
26. Sartre 1991, p. 49.
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aggressively argued today but still widely shared across the political spectrum. 
In the heyday of this kind of historiography scholars would flatly deny or 
downplay the elements of economic rationalism in ‘precapitalist’ agriculture, 
the extent of wage-labour and landlessness, the growth of a money economy, 
the reality of banking, etc.27
Among the various points that Charlie Post makes in his critique is that 
‘Conceptually, the notion of merchant or commercial capitalism represents a 
step backwards for historical materialism’.28 But backwards from what exactly? 
The hermetic stagnation of a formalist historiography that remains thoroughly 
introverted both intellectually and theoretically? Certainly, infinitely less 
productive (of good history) than the substantial body of work (both Marxist 
and non-Marxist) on diverse groups of merchant capitalists across vast 
swathes of history – from Spanish traders in the Roman Mediterranean29 to 
the consorterie of powerful capitalists who controlled Venice’s trade to the 
Levant and Venice itself some ten centuries later,30 or the Glasgow firms 
that dominated the tobacco trade in the eighteenth century,31 or the London 
West-India merchant houses who were the backbone of the sugar industry in 
sectors of the Caribbean that had seen the most rapid expansion of slavery 
in the seventeenth century,32 or the London merchant-directors who were 
pivotal to the De Beers diamond business.33 As if any of these groups, or for 
that matter the large Italian mercantile and banking houses of the fourteenth 
century, were suspended in an economic void and not part of emerging or 
established networks of commercial capitalism! Indeed, in one of his earliest 
papers Brenner himself notes:
In marked contrast to the established London trades colonial operations required 
investment in commodity production, not merely in commodity exchange . . . The 
nascent plantation economy needed constant injections of outside capital to get 
it started and keep it going . . . Merchants might purchase and directly operate 
their own plantations. Otherwise they could enter into partnership with colonial 
planters, supplying them with land, tools and servants and marketing the final 
27. On the other side see excellent works like Stone 1962; Stone 2005; Campbell 2003 (medieval 
estates); Rathbone 1991 (Roman estates); Cohen 1992 (Athenian banking); and Swain 2013 
(commercial mentalities, Roman and Islamic).
28. Post 2013, p. 88.
29. Mayet 1984.
30. Cracco 1967; consorterie were aristocratic cliques or factions made up of groups of 
families.
31.  Devine 1975.
32. Smith 2006; Dunn 1972, p. 224.
33. Newbury 1989.
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product . . . As the number of participants grew, competition became increasingly 
fierce.34
How is this not capitalism except by the circular abstraction that confines it 
by definition to industrial capital? In any case, it is almost thirty years since 
David Ormrod produced an excellent critique of the ‘false antithesis’ between 
production and circulation, capitalist agriculture and merchant capitalism, 
that underpins the whole of this tendency.35
Related to this is our assessment of the place of modern slavery in the growth 
of capitalism. Post’s further argument that ‘plantation slavery, even when 
subordinated to a capitalist world-market, cannot be understood as a capitalist 
form of social labour’36 contradicts Marx’s own repeated assertions to the 
effect that the American plantation owners were capitalists, e.g., ‘The business 
in which slaves are used is conducted by capitalists’;37 ‘we now not only call the 
plantation owners in America capitalists, but . . . they are capitalists’;38 and so 
on. Not so Post, who refers evasively to planters being ‘compelled to maximise 
absolute surplus-labour extraction’39 (his italics). But ‘absolute surplus-labour’ 
is of course a meaningless expression. Marx nowhere talks about ‘absolute’ and 
‘relative’ surplus-labour (how could he?), the distinction he makes is between 
absolute and relative surplus-value.40 For obvious reasons, Post is reluctant to 
talk about American slaves being compelled to produce surplus-value, as that 
would be conceding too much ground.
Post’s key objection is that ‘the slaves could not be expelled from production 
to allow the introduction of labour-saving tools and methods and a shift to 
relative surplus-labour [sic!] extraction . . . instead they must be sold to another 
master’.41 But this distinction affects only the determination of form (slaves 
were fixed capital, the price paid for a slave is, for Marx, an ‘anticipated and 
capitalized surplus-value’).42 To sustain the argument, Post would have to show 
34. Brenner 1972.
35. Ormrod 1985; the term ‘Political Marxism’ is already there in this excellent monograph.
36. Post 2013, p. 83.
37. Marx 1968, p. 303; his emphasis.
38. Marx 1973, p. 513; his emphasis.
39. Post 2013, p. 84.
40. See Marx 1976, Chapter 16. In the Grundrisse Marx does in one passage (Marx 1973, p. 338) 
use the expression ‘relative surplus labour’ but the context, a discussion of the quantitative 
boundaries of surplus-value, clearly shows that he only means relative surplus labour-time (as 
in Marx 1968, p. 439, where he refers to ‘absolute surplus-time’ and ‘relative surplus-time’, or 
later in the Grundrisse itself, when he says ‘Absolute, not relative surplus time predominates in 
manufacture’, Marx 1973, p. 588).
41.  Post 2013, p. 84.
42. Marx 1981, p. 945.
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that the US slave economy entailed inherent constraints on the liquidation 
of slave capital, in other words, that there was no market for slave labour, 
whereas the evidence suggests that the buying and selling of slaves occurred 
on a large scale.43 Slaves could be expelled, planters could introduce labour-
saving machinery,44 and massive investments in slave labour could ‘enhance 
the productivity of future laborers’, as with the creation of South Carolina’s 
tidal rice plantations.45
In any case, it is worth noting that the position Post and other ‘political 
Marxists’ espouse is even less nuanced than the one Genovese took in The 
World the Slaveholders Made. For the latter there was clearly no essential 
conflict between using slave labour and running a capitalist enterprise. If there 
had been, it would be hard to see how Genovese could have written, ‘The rise 
of the sugar ingenio in nineteenth-century Cuba represented the rise of a new 
class of capitalist slaveholders for whom slavery was an economic expedient’, 
or described the slaveholders of the British Caribbean as installing a regime 
that ‘bore the clear stamp of capitalist enterprise’.46
Sébastien Rioux’s paper is an excellent rebuttal of a kind of Marxism which, 
because it sees ‘extra-economic’ coercion as ‘non-capitalist by definition’,47 
logically ends up giving tacit support to the widespread view on the Left in 
43. E.g., Dusinberre 1996, pp. 401ff., where he refers to the ‘perpetual buying and selling of rice 
slaves’.
44. See Tomich’s critique of Moreno Fraginals, Tomich 2004, pp. 88–93.
45. Dusinberre 1996, pp. 405, 6ff.
46. Genovese 1969, pp. 70, 29; italics mine. To allude finally to another strand of his criticisms, 
Post claims that ‘Banaji does not demonstrate that the estate owners’ ability to acquire, maintain 
or expand their land holdings depended upon successful commodity production’. (Post 2013, 
p. 85.) Since ‘successful commodity production’ is clearly meant in the sense of the ability to 
compete successfully, this verges on a vast subject that can scarcely be discussed here. But note 
that the drive to control competition through cartel-like arrangements that Mickwitz discussed 
for late antiquity would make little sense unless there was at least ‘competition among producers 
of the same type of commodity’ (Marx 1981, p. 281), see Mickwitz 1936 and Banaji 2007a, pp. 32–6. 
That commodity production was not central to the fortunes of the aristocracy (whichever period 
of Roman history one looks at) is unlikely. It is argued at length in Banaji 2007b that the huge 
monetary assets of the late Roman aristocracy must to a very large degree have depended on their 
business activities, from trading and commercial enterprises to  industrial-scale monocultures 
(wine, olive-oil), operations in the money market (bankers, nummularii, were the proverbial 
economic elite), and of course a very wide range of industries. And what I did demonstrate in 
Agrarian Change in Late Antiquity was the existence of a powerful monetary economy, with 
estates generating thousands of solidi a year. Unless the aristocracy engaged in commodity 
production (‘successful’ or otherwise), it is hard to see how it could have generated this scale of 
resources (as much as 1200lbs of gold from Theodahad’s estates in Tuscany in the second quarter 
of the sixth century; equivalent to $15 million at the current US price of gold).
47. Rioux 2013, p. 94.
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countries like India that much of the economy still labours under precapitalist 
regimes, whether we call those ‘semi-feudalism’ or something else. It is worth 
noting that one of the most orthodox and classic accounts of Marx’s Capital, 
namely, Henryk Grossman’s book on breakdown theory, devoted a substantial 
part of its exposition to the central role played by slavery and the colonies 
more generally in the accumulation of capital, not least through the latter’s 
drive to expand the available mass of surplus-value.48 At a methodological 
level, Rioux notes that the slave-based capitalism of the US South is a striking 
illustration of the distinction between individual and total capital and of 
Marx’s ability to conceptualise accumulation and tie it together at different 
levels of abstraction. I agree completely. On the other hand, the passage cited 
from Marx’s letter to Annenkov is less revealing in this respect than it might 
have been. Slavery, Marx says there, is pivotal to modern industry because 
the slave-based colonies ‘created world trade’ and ‘it is world trade that is 
the precondition of large-scale industry’. What this image reflects is a purely 
external characterisation of the links between the slave colonies and British 
capitalism, a set of functional descriptions. By the 1860s this was no longer how 
Marx conceived the relationship between slavery and capitalism, and I would 
like to suggest that the real reason why Marx had to acknowledge the capitalist 
nature of the plantations was the impact of the colonial trades on the equalisation 
of the general rate of profit, in particular their role in ‘raising the general level 
of profit’.49 The crucial passage comes in Volume Three: ‘As far as capital 
invested in the colonies, etc. is concerned . . . the reason why this can yield 
higher rates of profit is that the profit rate is generally higher there on account 
of the lower degree of development, and so too is the exploitation of labour, 
through the use of slaves and coolies, etc. Now there is no reason why the higher 
rates of profit that capital invested in certain branches yields in this way, and 
brings home to its country of origin, should not enter into the equalization of the 
general rate of profit and hence raise this in due proportion, unless monopolies 
stand in the way.’50 Again, ‘the average rate of profit depends on the level of 
exploitation of labour as a whole by capital as a whole’.51 ‘Labour as a whole’, 
thus including slave labour and any other form of labour whose exploitation 
generated capital. It was Marx’s recognition of the contribution of the colonial 
trades to the general rate of profit that tilted his conception decisively in favour 
of seeing the Atlantic slave economies as essentially capitalist.52
48. Grossmann 1970, pp. 388–421.
49. Marx 1968, p. 436.
50. Marx 1981, p. 345; italics mine.
51.  Marx 1981, p. 299.
52. So too in Banaji 2014, forthcoming.
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The most stimulating review of Theory as History to my mind is the series of 
questions that course through Henry Bernstein’s review essay in the Journal of 
Agrarian Change, and this may be a good chance to take up at least one or two 
of the points made there.53 When Bernstein states that a fundamental part of 
my conception is the view that ‘long histories of merchant capital/commercial 
capitalism are integral to the development of modern (industrial) capitalism’, 
the mediation presupposed here is of course the world market. And this was 
certainly Marx’s position in Capital, both in the famous chapter on the ‘Genesis 
of the Industrial Capitalist’ where he sets out the ‘different moments of primitive 
accumulation’ as a dispersed but increasingly integrated global process, and 
in Volume Three, Chapter 20 (‘Historical Material on Merchant’s Capital’), 
despite the claim here that the development of commercial capital ‘taken by 
itself is insufficient to explain the transition from one mode of production to 
the other’.54 In the famous ‘Appendix’, merchant’s capital is even described as 
‘the form that provides the soil from which modern capitalism has grown’.55 
But as Thompson noted, ‘Marx never pretended, when writing Capital, that he 
was writing the history of capitalism’.56
Whether the ‘colonisation of Latin America was a feudal colonisation, a 
response to the crisis of feudal profitability’, as Vilar argued,57 or driven by 
capitalist interests, or a combination of both, the opening of the Atlantic (and 
the colonial system more widely) was for Marx decisive to ‘the development of 
capitalist production during the period of manufacture’.58 Trade revolutionised 
industry, even if (Marx claims) ‘the modern mode of production in its first 
period, that of manufacture, developed only where the conditions for it had 
been created in the Middle Ages’.59 Marx works here at different levels, knowing 
that ‘capitalism cannot have emerged from a single confined source’60 and 
retaining the tension between the different dynamisms at work.
Since Bernstein rightly notes that ‘Brenner’s position directly confronts 
Banaji’s arguments for commercial capitalism as the source of the (eventual) 
emergence of modern capitalism in the West’,61 it may be worth adding 
that Brenner’s own account of the transition in England’s countryside is 
scarcely impregnable and has been left seriously weakened by Jane Whittle’s 
53. Bernstein 2013.
54. Marx 1981, p. 444.
55. Marx 1976, p. 1023.
56. Thompson 1978, p. 249.
57. Vilar 1971; followed by me in Chapter 2 (written in 1974).
58. Marx 1976, p. 924.
59. Marx 1981, p. 450, adding: ‘Compare Holland with Portugal, for example’.
60. Braudel cited in Burke 1990, p. 49.
61.    Bernstein 2013, p. 324.
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critique in The Development of Agrarian Capitalism. As she argues, ‘Agrarian 
capitalism must have developed by the late sixteenth century, because only 
then can Brenner explain why England was experiencing wider, dynamic 
capitalist development by the seventeenth century’.62 Yet, ‘we cannot accept 
a chronology which argues that agrarian capitalism had developed by the late 
sixteenth century: the mid-eighteenth century would be a more convincing 
date. It was only by this time that a significant proportion of agricultural 
labourers were capitalist workers, and small subsistence-orientated farmers 
firmly on the decline’.63 ‘[T]he widespread existence of hired workers in the 
sixteenth century did not indicate new capitalist development.’64 And finally, 
‘To assert that economic development was not inevitable in pre-capitalist 
societies, as Brenner does, avoids the question of how and why it did occur. 
The creation of capitalist class relations . . . cannot be explained without 
considering the economic developments that did occur in medieval and early 
modern England’.65
62. Whittle 2000, p. 25.
63. Whittle 2000, p. 24.
64. Whittle 2000, p. 303.
65. Whittle 2000, p. 26. A final comment on one of Henry Bernstein’s many valid queries: ‘It 
is not clear whether Banaji believes that “commercial capitalism” did exist in tributary modes of 
production or in late antiquity, as distinct from, and more than, variously designated capitalist 
“elements”, “sectors”, “tendencies” and so on . . .’ (Bernstein 2013, pp. 320–1). Yes, I do believe that, 
as long as the ‘economic system’ described in that way does not overstate its claims. It may be 
worth adding therefore that the other impressive feature of the tributary mode was the vast scale 
of monetary circulation that characterised most regimes based on powerful taxing states. Not 
only was the state ‘(largely) independent from the ruling classes’, as Trotsky said of Tsarism, but 
it ‘absorbed a disproportionately large share of the surplus product’ (Trotsky 1972, pp. 6, 10). This 
means that collection of the land tax in cash (if and when this happened) was bound to have 
major implications for the long-term dynamic of these modes of production, both in terms of 
the extent of their monetary sector and for the economic activities of bankers, merchants and 
power-elites within the wider imperial nobility. Thus Athar Ali 1997, pp. 154ff., tells us ‘the income 
of the jagirdars was derived mainly in cash . . . [W]e find nobles of the period accumulating 
enormous treasures in specie, cash and jewels . . . A big source for capital needed for sea-borne 
trade came from the Mughal aristocrats’. Cf. Richards 1981, p. 292: ‘Numerous examples attest that 
the Mughal nobles freely entered the market. As investors, speculators, engrossers, merchants, or 
ship-owners, they used their own funds, and occasionally monopoly powers, to make a profit’, 
describing them later in the same paper as ‘the more and more commercially minded nobles of 
the empire’. Byzantine aristocrats were no different. Cheynet 2006, I, p. 27, notes that ‘it is now 
well established that members of the aristocracy, both in Constantinople and in the provinces, 
engaged resolutely in commerce, often through complacent intermediaries’. Oikonomidès 1979, 
pp. 64ff., describes Byzantine ‘private capital’ as ‘abundant’ under the Paleologues, suggests that 
business partnerships were common, and notes that the leading bankers [argyropratai] were also 
involved in commercial ventures. But Italian merchants discouraged their expansion to the West 
(p. 85), and Byzantium failed to develop a textile industry of its own thanks to ‘the impossibility 
of sustaining the competition of the more advanced industries of western Europe’ (p. 104). In 
any case, by the twelfth century Venice dominated the markets of the Greek Empire, just as the 
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